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Abstract 
The relative efficiency of auctions and negotiations is still a puzzle in the literature.  While 
auctions are the prescribed procedures and the most used ones for public procurement, in the 
private sector, where buyers are free to choose their purchasing method, competitive tendering 
is far from being their preferred option (Bajari et al. 2009).  In addition, recent empirical studies 
(Estache et al. 2009, Bajari et al. 2009) highlight some failures of auction procedures and 
identify conditions under which negotiation is more efficient.  In particular, they show that 
auctions perform poorly when projects are complex.   
In this paper, our aim is to contribute to this debate by providing an empirical analysis of how 
awarding mechanisms are chosen in public procurement in France.  To this end, we examine a 
comprehensive database of 76,188 observations corresponding to the entire set of public 
procurement work contracts awarded between 2005 and 2007 in the construction sector.  We 
find empirical regularities regarding the choice of awarding procedures by public buyers.  
However, most of these regularities do not coincide with what the theoretical literature 
considers as transaction-cost minimizing behaviours.  In particular, the size of the construction 
projects as well as the length of contracts do not appear as key determinants of the choice of 
awarding procedures, which translates into costly renegotiations.   
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
This paper benefited from comments received at various seminars and conferences, including the 
ISNIE 2010 conference, the conference on Applied Infrastructure Research in Berlin and the 
workshop “Manufacturing Markets” in Firenze.  In particular, we would like to thank Ricard Gil, 
Leonardo Meeus, Jean-Michel Oudot, Pablo Spiller and Frank Wolak for very helpful comments on 
earlier versions of the paper.   
                                                           
♣ ADIS, University Paris 11, e-mail address: chong.eshien@online.fr.  
♦
 Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris 1, e-mail address: carine.staropoli@univ-paris1.fr. 
♠
 Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, University Paris 1, e-mail address : yvrande@univ-paris1.fr 
(corresponding author). 
 2 
 1. Introduction 
Public procurement refers to the public authorities’ activities of purchasing goods, works and 
services.  These purchases range from simple items such as pens and paper clips through to 
complex goods or construction works.  Hence public procurement markets represent a major 
part of economic activities.  For instance, in the European Union, total public procurement is 
estimated at about 17% of EU GDP (€2000 billion) in 20071, while in France it represents 16.6% 
of GDP.2  
Procurement policy also plays an important role in addressing social and environmental 
problems (EU, 2005) and in developing the private sector in general and specific segments of the 
industry (SME notably).  Additionally, in the European context, an effective public procurement 
policy is fundamental to improve the functioning of the Internal Market and enable the EU to 
reap the full benefits from an enlarged Internal Market.  For that purpose, community rules on 
public procurement have been set up (Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC).  
As in the US, the rules organizing public procurement in Europe strongly advocate the use of 
auctions to award contracts and select final providers of goods and services to public entities 
while the circumstances when negotiation can be used are strictly restricted.  Such preference 
for competitive tendering over negotiated procedures in public procurement is justified by the 
assumption that auctions allow finding supply sources at the cheapest price and at acceptable 
quality.  Auctions are also favoured because they are seen as a way to prevent favouritism and 
ensure equal opportunity to potential suppliers.  As a matter of fact, auctions remain the 
dominant award mechanism for public procurement contracts.  Thus, in France, from 2005 to 
2007, auctions were used to award 70% of the procurement contracts in the public works sector 
while in Europe they correspond to 82% in 2008 (Internal Market Scoreboard, 2009).  
Yet, recent empirical and theoretical contributions show that auctions are not a panacea, as 
already pointed out by Williamson (1976).  Interestingly, while public and private procurement 
share the same essential purpose of obtaining the lowest price without loss of quality, the 
practices of each sector are different.  Thus, as documented by Bajari et al. (2009), “from 1995 to 
2000, almost half of private sector non-residential building construction projects in Northern 
California were procured using negotiations, while the rest were procured with some form of 
competitive bidding.  Only eighteen percent were procured using unrestricted open competitive 
bidding, which is what FAR dictates for the public sector” (ibid, p. 1).  In other words, while 
auctions are the prescribed procedures and the most used ones for public procurement, in the 
private sector - where buyers are free to choose their purchasing method - competitive 
tendering is far from being their preferred option.   
In addition, as shown by several recent empirical works (Guasch 2004, Guasch et al. 2008, 
Estache et al. 2009), public procurement contracts awarded via competitive tendering are 
frequently renegotiated, which generates significant additional costs and questions the 
efficiency of the procedure itself.  Thus for instance, Guccio et al. (2008), in a study of public 
works procurement contracts in Italy in 2005, estimate that, for about a quarter of all works, 
adaptation costs consecutive to renegotiations increase the original costs by 10%.  Additionally, 
the main argument justifying the use of auctions for public procurement (to prevent collusive 
practices and corruption) is severely called into question.  Numerous theoretical developments 
indeed show that competitive tendering procedures are not immune to corruption, collusion 
and/ or favoristism (Compte et al. 2005, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin 2006, Auriol et al. 
2009).  
These paradoxical observations regarding the use of auctions and negotiation in public 
procurement are the starting point of our paper which aims at empirically investigating the 
                                                           
1 Internal Market Scoreboard, n°19, July 2009. 
2 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/public-proc-market-final-
report_en.pdf. 
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determinants of award procedures.  For this purpose, we use an exhaustive dataset of 76,188 
French public works contracts attributed at various levels of decisions (central government, 
including agencies, universities, hospitals etc., and local governments) between 2005 and 2007.  
Based on these data, our paper highlights empirical regularities on what motivates public buyers 
when choosing a given procedure.  In line with recent developments in the transaction cost 
literature, our work contributes to the discussion on the relative merits of alternative awarding 
mechanisms in a context where the will to implement competition to avoid corruption and 
favoritism should favor auctions, while the effective governance for complex and sometimes 
unique work should be “relational contracting” or negotiations.  From a theoretical perspective, 
this debate has received a lot of attention since the seminal papers by Demsetz (1968) and 
Williamson (1976) who expressed opposite views on the efficiency of franchise bidding for 
natural monopolies.  However, very few empirical works have been done to confront their 
propositions with facts, which is precisely what motivates the present work. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the theoretical arguments developed in 
the procurement literature regarding the respective merits of auction and negotiation.  This 
survey allows us to identify the conditions under which auctions are more efficient than 
negotiation procedures.  Section 3 presents public procurement practices in the construction 
sector in France thereby emphasizing the nature of the transactions and the governance 
problems that characterize the construction process.  Section 4 is devoted to empirically 
investigate the main determinants of the choice of procedure in the French construction sector.  
We first deal with the impact of buyer’s experience and expertise on the choice of award 
procedure.  Then, we assess the role of projects’ size and contracts’ duration.  Section 5 is 
dedicated to the analysis of the renegotiations that have occurred which is a first step towards 
an efficiency analysis of the trade-off between auction and negotiation.  Section 6 concludes on 
the economic rationale behind the choice of awarding procedures.  
 
 2. Auction versus negotiation: the theoretical debate  
Besides the traditional literature on auctions which emphasizes the efficiency properties of such 
attribution mechanisms as means to introduce competition and prevent corruption (Bulow and 
Klemperer 1996), a growing body of the procurement literature supports the promotion of 
alternative award procedures (more particularly negotiation) or at least questions the 
conditions under which auctions can efficiently be used.  The arguments put to the front to 
qualify the efficiency of auctions echo the ones used by the proponents of the Transaction Cost 
Economics’ view in the now classical ‘franchise bidding of natural monopolies’ debate which 
opposed, in the 1970’s, Demsetz (1968), on the one hand, to Williamson (1976) and Goldberg 
(1976, 1977), on the other hand.  While Demsetz (1968) considered that competitive tendering 
was the ideal mechanism to regulate natural monopolies, Williamson (1976) and Goldberg 
(1976, 1977) highlighted the failures of auction procedures, arguing that in the presence of 
relationship-specific investments and high uncertainty the contractual disabilities of the parties 
mitigate the efficiency of the franchise bidding mechanism and militate in favour of the use of 
alternative coordination devices, like utilities regulation.3 
In the broader context of public procurement, the trade-off between regulation and franchise 
bidding translates into a trade-off between negotiation and auction.  While regulation and 
franchise bidding are two ways to select and/or control a natural monopoly, the literature on 
procurement, in its recent developments, views auction and negotiation as alternative ways to 
select a provider of goods and services, each one presenting its own advantages and limits 
(Manelli and Vincent 1995, Bajari et al. 2009).   
                                                           
3 See Priest (1993) or Crocker and Masten (1996) for a detailed review of the debate. 
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In a nutshell, while auctions are supposed to ensure transparency, selection of the lowest cost 
bidders by benefiting from competition and prevent biased awarding of contracts, it may have 
some undesirable self-selection consequences and fail to respond optimally to ex post 
adaptation.  On the contrary, negotiations may easily be suspected of corruption and favouritism 
but in the same time these “relational” contracting modes allow public buyers and suppliers to 
spend more time discussing ex ante the characteristics of the project to be delivered, and the 
appropriate design of the contract thereby reducing the risk of ex post opportunistic haggling.  
Hence, according to this literature, the trade-off between auctions and negotiations in public 
procurement is assumed to depend on (1) the buyers’ level of expertise and competencies 
regarding the organization of competitive tendering, (2) the potential for competition, and (3) 
the level of complexity of the project to be procured.  In what follows, we present the theoretical 
arguments regarding these three aspects.  In the next session, we investigate whether we can 
find empirical regularities suggesting that these aspects influence French public buyers’ decision 
regarding the choice of an award procedure for works contracts. 
 
 2.1. Buyers’ competencies  
A first challenge buyers have to face is to define the characteristics of the work to be procured.  
This task may be particularly difficult when buyers have no clear preferences or lack the 
technical expertise (e.g. knowledge of construction techniques, materials, process) required to 
describe the project.  In such circumstances of limited capabilities of the buyers, negotiation 
should be the preferred awarding procedure because it allows the buyers to discuss the project 
with the potential suppliers and hence improve its design and specification before work begins.  
Conversely, experienced buyers, because they build more frequently and/ or have competent 
technicians and engineers in-house are expected to use auctions more frequently, all else held 
constant (Goldberg 1977; Bajari et al. 2009).    
The second challenge linked to buyers’ competencies concerns the organization of the awarding 
procedure itself.  Many public procurement processes are carried out by municipalities or small 
agencies which may have neither the experience nor the knowledge of how to organize an 
efficient award procedure that is respectful of the rather complex and changing legislation and 
may then be afraid of being suspected of favouritism or corruption.  Furthermore, the increasing 
number of recourses notably by eliminated candidates increases the fear of being suspected of 
favouritism or any kind of discretionary power.4  In order to avoid such suspicions, public 
buyers are inclined to choose auction.  This last argument echoes the one developed by Spiller 
(2008) on the incidence of public scrutiny on the choices made by public contractors.  In 
particular, he argues that the pressure exerted by interested third-parties (e.g. political 
competitors) might lead public bodies to avoid negotiation and relational contracting and prefer 
rigid procedural processes such as auctions.  
 
 2.2. Potential for competition  
There are critical pitfalls in auction design since, depending on the circumstances, auctions are 
very vulnerable to collusion and may deter entry into the auction (Porter and Zona 1993; 
Klemperer 2002).  The benefits for auctioning may thus be reduced if not totally cancelled in 
case of collusive market since there might not be enough bidders to assure that the winning 
                                                           
4 For instance, the European Court of Justice has published 200 judgements and orders containing the 
keywords “public procurement” and “award” between 1997 and 2009.  27.5% of these judgements were 
made between 1997 and 2003, 72.5% of these judgements were made between 2004 and 2009.  Moreover 
the recent EU Directive 2007/66/EC seeks to allow potential candidates to legally contest award decisions 
made by public buyers.  Therefore, the legal risks supported by public buyers can be expected to become 
higher. 
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price will differ significantly from the monopoly price.  Among the various circumstances that 
participate to increasing the risks that participants may explicitly or tacitly collude, the number 
of potential respondents to the competitive tender is a crucial determinant for the success of 
auctioning.  In a nutshell, if the market is highly concentrated - few potential respondents - 
auction may be less attractive than negotiation. 
 
 2.3 Complexity 
The variable that has undoubtedly deserved the most attention in the literature on public 
procurement is the complexity of the goods/works to be procured.  Defined as the difficulty to 
provide a rather complete set of plans and contingencies of a project, complexity is considered in 
the literature as a key determinant of the choice of an awarding procedure.  More precisely, 
negotiation is advocated when the project is complex that is when ex ante design is hard to 
complete and ex post adaptations are expected.  By contrast, competitive tendering is the 
recommended awarding mechanism for projects and services that are simple to describe and for 
which there are no objective reasons for ex post adaptations (Mougeot and Naegelen 1988, 
Bajari et al. 2009).  Auctions are thus an effective way of determining the lowest cost supplier 
where the price of the project being procured is the buyer’s only concern.   
But auctions work less well for complex projects or services for which a vector of prices is to be 
determined and/or for which the buyer highly cares about other attributes of procurement like 
quality or reliability (Manelli and Vincent 1995).  In such cases, the selection principles of the 
winning bidder are indeed difficult to determine.  Although multidimensional auctions 
theoretically appear as a natural practical solution to deal with such circumstances, they are 
very often too complex to implement in practice because of their lack of transparency and their 
greater vulnerability to corruption and favouritism (Burguet and Che 2004, Estache et al. 2009).   
Another risk incurred when auctions are used for complex projects is the increase of the bidding 
costs.  Indeed, if the buyer fails to specify the subject matter of the bid with precision then 
uncertainties will result, costs of bidding will be increased, and applicants will be discouraged.  
The number of bidders being limited, the expected benefits of competitive tendering would 
consequently be affected.  Or, as shown by Bajari et al. (2007), the number of bidders may not be 
limited but, since they anticipate future renegotiation due to contractual incompleteness, their 
bid may incorporate high risk premia for them to be able to recover potential adaptation costs.5  
Finally, if the description of the project is not sufficiently clear, competitive tendering may also 
lead to situations of adverse selection and end up with the selection of the most opportunistic 
bidder (Bajari et al. 2009).  If contractual design is incomplete and service is complex, auction 
may indeed lead to choosing the bidder who is the most aware of the contractual blanks he could 
exploit, that is to say the one who is able to determine where contracts will fail.  Anticipating 
that he will be able to take advantage of situations that are unforeseen in the contract by 
renegotiating the initial arrangement, this strategic candidate will not hesitate to propose an 
unrealistically low price.  This type of bidding behaviour (low-balling strategy) jeopardizes 
allocative efficiency, which is the most important objective of tendering.   
To sum up the propositions derived from the literature, the trade-off between auction and 
negotiation in public procurement is assumed to depend on (1) the competencies of public 
buyers regarding the design of the project and the organization of competitive tendering, (2) the 
potential for competition, (3) the level of complexity of the project to be procured.  Moreover, it 
has been argued theoretically that auction-based procedures are more likely to lead to ex post 
adjustments, and these adjustments are potentially more costly. In the next section, we intend to 
identify and document such regularities in the French public procurement practices using data 
on public procurement work contracts.  To this end, we first investigate the determinants of 
                                                           
5 In their study of highway construction and maintenance contracts in California, Bajari et al. (2007) 
estimate these risk premia to represent, in average, 10% of the value of the contract. 
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award procedures using variables that may serve as proxies for the three classes of 
determinants identified above.  In a second subsection, we look into the occurrence of contract 
amendments to understand whether ex post adjustments occur as the theory predicts.   
 
 3. Public procurement in the construction sector in France 
 3.1. Work contracts 
Our study focuses on works contracts, which represent 35% of the procurement contracts in 
2007 in France.  Given the definition provided by the EU Directive works cover the whole range 
of construction works from site preparation, complete or part construction and civil engineering 
utility sectors, building installation (electrical, plumbing and sanitary, mechanical etc.) and 
building completion.  This diversity translates into various situations regarding the level of 
complexity, coordination problems, uncertainty or potential opportunistic behaviors from 
contracting parties.   
Thanks to the rich and exhaustive data provided by the Economic Observatory of Public 
Procurement of the French Ministry of Finance (OEAP), we have been able to build a 
comprehensive database covering the public work procurement activities undertaken by public 
buyers during three consecutive years, from 2005 to 2007.  More precisely, the database 
contains information on some characteristics of the projects (e.g. type of work) and their 
afferent contract (e.g. value, duration, identity of contractors, awarding procedure, price, 
number of subcontractors, renegotiation).  During this period, a total of 76,188 procurement 
contracts have been passed by 8,216 public buyers in France.  However, for motives of 
coherence and robustness, we had to reduce our sample to 72,283 procurement contracts on 
public works.  
 
 3.2. Buyers 
Buyers can be distinguished between central administrations (i.e., ministries, museums, 
universities, hospitals and other bodies governed by public law, or associations formed by one 
or more of such authorities or bodies governed by public law) and local administrations (e.g. 
regions, départements, municipalities, etc.).  For simplicity, we will refer to the former as “central 
buyers” and the latter as “local buyers”.   
There are 7,645 local buyers and 517 central buyers who have awarded at least one 
procurement contract on public work during the 3 years of our sample.  Over this period, the 
bulk of procurement activities stems from local buyers (90.1% of total procurement contracts).  
However, the average number of procurement contracts per central buyer is 13.83 and only 8.5 
per local buyer.  Procurement activities as measured by the value of contracts are more 
important on the whole for local buyers, even if the average value of a public work contract is 
more important for central buyers (the average contract for a central buyer amounts to about 
508,898€ while for a local buyer it is about 407,949€).  In terms of contract duration, the 
average duration for a public work contract is about 12.21 months long. 
 
 3.3. Procedures  
The French Public Procurement Code holds that public buyers may choose among 8 formalized 
awarding procedures for work contracts between € 4,000 net of VAT and € 5,150,000 net of 
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VAT6.  These procedures differ in various dimensions including publication rules, openness to 
effective competition, selection criteria and process.  
In order to stick to the literature, we focus on 5 procedures that can be grouped into two main 
categories: “auction”, which gathers the open and restricted auction procedures, and 
“negotiation”, which gathers the three procedures for which selection is made after consultation 
of the candidates and negotiation of contracts’ conditions.  
Open competitive tender is by far the favorite choice of French public buyers and, altogether, 
open and restricted auctions are used for about 72% of public work contracts over the three 
years 2005-2007.  Even if the use of negotiated procedures is somehow restricted to specific 
situations, it still represents about 17% of award procedures, negotiation with prior publication 
and call for competition being by far the most popular negotiated procedure.  
Along the years, there has been a slight evolution in the type of procedure used by public buyers.  
Indeed, over the period 2005-2007, there is a decrease in the use of competitive tender 
procedures on the overall: while this procedure accounts for 73% of total procurement 
contracts in 2005, this ratio falls to 63% in 2007.  Thus, despite the growing emphasize in the EU 
directives on the merits of competitive tendering, there seems to be a drift in France towards 
less competitive procedures, namely negotiated procedures.  The remainder of this paper helps 
assessing this evolution. 
 
 4. Auctions versus negotiations: an empirical analysis 
 
 4.1 The determinants of award procedures for French public work 
procurement contracts 
In the following, we investigate how various determinants may impact the public buyer's choice 
of award procedure by examining correlations between the observed award procedures and 
proxies for each of the identified determinants using simple statistics and/or distribution 
graphs. 
 
 4.1.1 Public buyer's expertise 
To explore the incidence of buyers’ capabilities on the choice of award procedures, we rely on 
two different proxies.  Firstly, we compare award procedures used by central and local buyers, 
and secondly, we rely on the number of public work contracts previously awarded as a measure 
of the buyer's experience.  The former variable may reflect buyer's expertise as central buyers 
are usually better staffed than local ones (OECD 1999).  Therefore, one may expect central 
buyers to be more competent in defining their projects.  The latter variable captures potential 
learning effects that a buyer could acquire by frequently dealing with public work procurement 
contracts.  Based on our theoretical discussion, we expect central buyers to rely more on auction 
based procedures.     
Figure 1 shows the use of various award procedures by central and local buyers.  It reveals no 
great differences in the choices made by these two categories of buyers: both use competitive 
tendering and negotiation in the same proportions.  The only noticeable difference concerns the 
use of restricted competitive tendering which is much more frequent for central buyers.  This 
may be explained by the size of the projects launched by central buyers which requires them to 
                                                           
6 These threshold are those used in 2007; they have been slightly modified in 2010, the upper threshold 
being € 4,845,00.  
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restrict the number of bidders.  This is consistent with the results obtained by Bajari et al. 
(2007) and Ye (2007) who find that, for projects involving large bidding costs, buyers should 
restrict competition in order to give qualified bidders an incentive to participate by maximizing 
their chance to win the project.   
 
Figure 1. Evolution of award procedures according to the administrative level of public 
buyers 
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As a measure of buyers’ experience, we use the cumulative sum of public works contracts 
awarded by a buyer (up to a given year) and check whether more experienced buyers tend to 
rely more on auctions.  
Table 1 shows that more experienced buyers tend to use competitive tendering more 
frequently.7  On average, the contractual experience of buyers who choose open auctions is 
significantly higher than the experience of those who choose restricted auctions (resp. 78.05 
contracts and 71.51 contracts).  This result corroborates that auction is chosen by public buyers 
that have the highest experience in terms of cumulative number of contracts.   
                                                           
7 We conducted a test of Student to check whether the mean public buyer’s experience when competitive 
tendering is used is significantly different from the mean public buyer’s experience for the three types of 
negotiation-based procedures.  The test statistic is -5.6002, indicating that the difference in means is 
significant at less than 1%. 
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Table 1. Award procedure and contractual experience 
Awarding procedures chosen at year t 
Public buyer’s contractual experience  
(cumulative sum of public works 
contracts signed up to year t) 
Mean Standard deviation 
Open auctions 78.05 126.33 
Restricted auction 71.51 108.74 
Negotiation with prior publicity and competition 68.50 114.36 
Negotiation without prior publicity and with 
competition 
66.67 87.30 
Negotiation without prior publicity nor competition 112.65 156.50 
Others 62.34 131.79 
Total 75.09 124.77 
 
 4.1.2 The potential for competition 
A second determinant of buyers’ choices relates directly to competitive pressure.  If available, 
we would use the number of potential respondents per tender, as well as various measures of 
industrial concentration and barriers to entry to explore the link between the potential for 
competition and the chosen award procedure.  Unfortunately, we do not have information on the 
pertinent market and consequently on these various measures.  Still, for each contract attributed 
in 2007 we have data on the number of proposals received by buyers.  Even if it cannot be 
considered as a concentration index, this variable still gives some indications on the intensity of 
competition and thereby might affect the relative efficiency of award procedures.  Indeed, fewer 
propositions submitted in a tender may either reflect a lack of potential candidates (and thus a 
concentrated market), or the fact that potential candidates refuse to submit or consider the 
tender as unsuited to them.  Such refusals may be due to real or supposed entry barriers linked 
to the bidding costs imposed to bidders or to suspicions of favouritism by the buyer towards a 
particular competitor (reducing the expectation to be selected).  It may also reflect collusive or 
entry-deterring behaviours from competitors.   
Figure 2. Distribution of the number of proposals received per contract (2007) 
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Our data reveal that the intensity of competition is moderate (Figure 2): in about 40% of the 
cases, public buyers have received two to three propositions, which may reflect limited 
competition, and in about 25% of the cases they have received 4 or 5 propositions.  Cases with 
more than 11 propositions represents 12% of the cases, while cases where buyers received only 
one proposition - which by definition reflects a lack of competition – represents 15%.  A more 
detailed analysis also reveals that the picture is relatively similar for both local and central 
buyers even if the market seems to be more competitive at the local level.   
It is also worth noting that on average the number of propositions received under negotiation 
with prior publication and call for competition and under open competitive tenders are almost 
the same (6.3 and 6.6 respectively) (Table 2).  This suggests that even with negotiated 
procedures, competition may not be altogether absent.   
Table 2. Number of propositions received by awarding procedures (2007) 
Procedures N Mean 
Open auctions 10,091 6.60 
Restricted auctions 395 4.55 
Negotiation with prior publication and competition 2,670 6.30 
Negotiation without prior publication nor competition 298 2.85 
Others 1,542 3.66 
Total 14,996 6.12 
 
 4.1.3 The complexity of a procurement project 
As explained below, we would expect that more complex projects are associated with 
negotiation-based procedures.  
Complexity is difficult to measure, especially given the vast amount and the wide diversity of 
contracts we have in the database.  As such, we use contract's value and duration as proxies for 
complexity in our empirical analysis: arguably, both dimensions are closely related the 
complexity of a project and this is consistent with previous works on the subject (e.g. Bajari et al. 
2007).  Indeed, considering that complex projects often involve a higher number of tasks and 
more collaborators, one may assume that more complex projects are more expensive.  Moreover, 
as uncertainty is a key determinant of complexity and as the former increases with time, one 
may consider that long-term projects are likely to be complex.  Figure 3 plots the distribution of 
contract duration by categories of contract value.  It illustrates that longer contracts are often 
associated with a higher initial contract value.  This positive correlation between contract value 
and duration may be driven the same underlying process—the degree of complexity. 
 11 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of contract duration and contract value 
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Table 3 shows simple statistics on contracts’ value and contracts’ duration according to the 
various award procedures.  These statistics do not corroborate the proposition according to 
which complex projects are more likely to be awarded via negotiated procedures.  Indeed, 
contracts awarded via auctions are longer and more expensive on average than contracts 
awarded via negotiation with prior publication and competition.  Furthermore, contracts’ value 
and duration are highest on average when restricted competitive tendering is used.  Lastly, 
auctioned contracts are on average longer than contracts awarded through negotiated 
procedures.  
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Table 3. Contracts value and duration by award procedures 
 
Procedures 
Contract 
value  
(€) 
Contract 
duration 
(months) 
Mean Mean 
Open auctions 447,963 12.86 
Restricted auctions 670,536 15.40 
Negotiation with prior publicity and 
competition 
361,323 11.62 
Negotiation without prior publicity and 
with competition 
461,808 11.95 
Negotiation without prior publicity nor 
competition 
451,731 11.93 
Others 206,784 7.52 
Total 417,934 12.21 
 
Figures 4 and 5 respectively show the share of award procedures used for different categories of 
contract value and contract duration.  Unsurprisingly, for all categories of contract values and 
durations, open auctions seem to be the favoured procedure.  However, what is interesting is 
that the share of auctioned contracts increases with contract value.  In terms of duration, one 
may observe a surge in the use of auction-based procedures for contracts longer than 24 
months.  On the overall, even when we break down award procedures according to contracts’ 
value and duration, higher contract values and longer contracts are more often associated with 
auction-based procedures.   
Figure 4: Distribution of award procedures for different categories of contract value 
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Figure 5: Distribution of award procedures for different categories of contract duration 
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If contract value and duration can be taken as an indication of project complexity, then our 
statistics indicate that more complex projects are associated with auction procedures.  Such an 
observation, however, is the opposite of what the theoretical literature predicts and departs 
from the procurement practices observed in the private sector (Bajari et al. 2007).  A plausible 
explanation may be driven by a specific characteristic of public procurement: the need to avoid 
suspicions of corruption or favouritism.  Expensive and long-term projects may be particularly 
prone to such suspicions, and the need for a public buyer to show that the contract is awarded 
fairly may therefore be stronger.  For such projects, auctions may be favoured by public buyers 
as these procedures are commonly seen as instigating greater transparency and fair 
competition.   
 
 5. Award procedures and contract amendments 
A second set of predictions put to the forefront in the recent economic literature is the relation 
between ex post coordination and award procedures.  In particular, it has been argued that 
contracts awarded through auction-based procedures are more prone to ex post adaptations 
(Guasch 2004; Bajari et al. 2007 etc.).  This leads us to empirically investigate ex post 
modifications to the initial contracts in the public works procurement.   
Using our data, we assess whether auction-based procedures actually lead to more ex post 
modifications, and whether, these modifications are more costly.  These aspects may be 
captured in our database by the number of amendments to the initial contracts and by the 
outcome of these amendments.  Economic theory leads us to expect a higher occurrence of 
contract amendments and more important changes in amended value and/or duration to the 
initial contract associated with auction-based procedures.  
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A total of 9,264 amendments to the initial contracts have been made between 2005 and 2007, 
representing about 13% of total procurement contracts within these three years.8  Such 
contractual amendments may lead to a change in contract value.  The total amount of 
amendments to contract's value represents about 15% of the total value of public works 
contracts.  This is significant and suggests that public works procurement contracts are not 
renegotiation-proof.   
Table 4 provides some statistics on contract amendments according to award procedures.  One 
can observe that about 73% of amended contracts were awarded using open competitive 
tenders, while about 11% of amended contracts were awarded via a negotiation-based 
procedure with prior publication and competition.  This may be due to the fact that auction 
procedures are more widely used than negotiation based procedures.  However, if we compare 
these figures to the share of each procedure used to award public work procurement contracts, 
the frequency of amendments when contract is awarded through an open competitive tender 
tends to be higher than the share of initial contracts awarded through this procedure (69% of 
total initial contracts), and the share of amendments to contracts awarded through negotiation 
with prior publication and competition tends to be lower than the share of initial contracts 
awarded through this procedure (16% of total initial contracts).  The frequency of amendments 
for contracts awarded through various other available procedures seems to reflect the share of 
their use according.  Thus, our statistics on the occurrence of amendments seem to be consistent 
with findings from the economic literature.  They suggest that negotiation-based procedures 
allow a public buyer to better specify a project ex ante.  In turn, this leads to a lower need to ex 
post adjustments for these projects.   
 
Table 4. Award procedures and contractual amendments 
Award procedure of the 
initial contract 
Number of 
amendments 
% 
Total value  
(millions 
€) 
% 
Mean value 
(millions 
€) 
Open auction 6,746 72.82% 5,228 81.17% 0.775 
Restricted auction 503 5.43% 531 8.25% 1.056 
Negotiation with 
publication and 
competition 
992 10.71% 380 5.91% 0.383 
Negotiation without 
publication and with 
competition 
46 0.50% 56 0.88% 1.237 
Negotiation without 
publication nor 
competition 
152 1.64% 98,067 1.52% 0.645 
Others 825 8.91% 146 2.27% 0.177 
Total 9,264 100% 6,442 100% 0.695 
 
The impact of amendments on contracts’ value also seems to be consistent with the general 
economic literature.  From table 4, one may indeed conclude that such amendments generally 
result in an increase in the contract's value, even if some amendments also lead to a reduction of 
the initial amount of projects.  Yet, this latter case tends to be quite marginal.  When we break 
down the modification to contracts' value according to the award procedure used, one finds that 
open competitive tenders induce more costly renegotiations.  Indeed, table 4 shows that 81% of 
the total amount induced by amendments concern contracts that were awarded using open 
                                                           
8 Relative frequencies are computed with respect that all procurement contracts in our database between 
2005 and 2007 i.e., accounting for contracts whose initial value is beyond the legal threshold of 
5,150,000,000€.   
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competitive tenders, whereas only 6% of the renegotiated amounts stem from contracts that 
were awarded using negotiations with prior publication and competition.  Interestingly, 
contracts awarded through restricted competitive tenders account for about 8% of total 
amended value, whereas such a procedure is used to award only 3.2% of initial procurement 
contracts.  
Figure 6 looks at the distribution of amended contract values for each type of procedures.  The 
figure shows that most amendments lead to increases in the contract’s value.  More importantly, 
the figure also shows that the share of auction-based procedures in our sample is associated 
with more contracts whose amendments increase substantially the value of the initial contracts.  
About 25% of amended contracts awarded using open auction result in an increase of over 
500,000€.  This concern about 35% of amended contract awarded through restricted 
competitive tenders.  In contrast, the share of amended contracts which result in an increase of 
over 500,000€ of the contracts’ initial value represents less than 20% of the contracts awarded 
through negotiation with prior publication and competition.9 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of amendments to contract values according to award procedures 
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This observed difference between the amended values of contracts awarded under different 
procedures corroborates the main insights from the economic literature: firstly, amendments to 
contracts awarded under auction procedures may result in a greater change in contracts' value 
because renegotiations may be more costly on the overall.10  One plausible explanation to the 
higher amended value associated with auction procedures may therefore reflect more costly 
renegotiations when contracts were initially awarded using such procedures.  Such an 
observation is also consistent with the hypothesis of opportunistic ex post renegotiations.  
Secondly, amended values of contracts awarded using auction-based procedures may be higher 
                                                           
9 We have conducted the same exercise distinguishing between central buyers and local buyers and found 
the same result i.e. the share of contractual amendments leading to a change of more than 500,000€ of the 
contracts’ initial value is larger when the amended contracts were initially auctioned. 
10
 This is because rents are dissipated during the initial auction procedure.  Hence, ex post adaptations to 
the initial contracts are met with more resistance (Bajari et al. 2007; Bajari et al. 2009). 
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simply because such contracts involve more complicated projects from the outset.  As mentioned 
before, higher contract value may mean more complex projects, and since such contracts are 
more likely to be awarded using an auction procedure, it is not surprising that there are more 
amendments to these contracts.  
In a nutshell, statistical observations suggest that there is a link between contract amendments 
and award procedures.  Furthermore, these statistical observations do not provide strong 
evidence against the major insights from economic literature: a majority of amended contracts 
were awarded using auction-based procedures, and contracts awarded through auction-based 
procedures seem to be associated with higher amended values.  
 
 5. Concluding remarks 
Although public procurement markets represent a major stake for economic activity and a large 
part of public spending, few empirical works have been made so far to investigate the 
procurement practices of public buyers.  Yet, theoretical academic papers and regulations are 
full of recommendations regarding the way to organize such markets.  Their advices can be 
summed up shortly as they largely emphasize the use of auctions to manufacture these markets.  
However, a recent literature, mostly relying on transaction cost theory, highlights the potential 
difficulties (public) buyers may encounter if they systematically choose competitive tendering to 
award their procurement markets.  More precisely, this literature points out the inefficiency of 
auction procedures to select providers of complex goods or services for which contracting is 
often subject to renegotiations.  
What we intended to do in this article is to describe the practices of French public buyers and try 
to find empirical regularities in the way they attribute procurement contracts.  Our study is 
based on an original database gathering the entire set of public works procurement contracts in 
France over the period 2005-2007.  The results of our preliminary statistical investigations 
question the efficiency of the French public buyers’ choices.  Indeed we show that their choices 
of awarding procedures are independent of their level of expertise, which, in line with Spiller 
(2008), can be interpreted as a consequence of third-party opportunism.  We also point out that 
public buyers decisions are not rational as they appear to depend neither on the value of the 
projects nor on their length although these variables are crucial determinants of projects’ 
complexity.  More precisely, auction-based procedures happen to be largely favored, whatever 
the characteristics of the project to be procured, and our data reveal that this translates into 
costly renegotiations.  However, whether these renegotiations could have been avoided through 
the use of negotiation instead of auction is still an open question.   
Further investigations are to be done to distinguish between “needed” and opportunistic 
contractual renegotiations and to deepen the analysis of the determinants of renegotiations.  
However, given the values at stake and the quasi-absence of rationale behind the buyers’ 
choices, one can reasonably bet that changes in the way procurement markets are manufactured 
may lead to significant savings.   
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